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Abstract—We enhance the physical layer security (PLS) of6
amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying networks with the aid of joint7
relay and jammer selection (JRJS), despite the deleterious effect8
of channel state information (CSI) feedback delays. Furthermore,9
we conceive a new outage-based characterization approach for the10
JRJS scheme. The traditional best relay selection (TBRS) is also11
considered as a benchmark. We first derive closed-form ex-12
pressions of both the connection outage probability (COP) and13
the secrecy outage probability (SOP) for both the TBRS and14
JRJS schemes. Then, a reliable and secure connection probability15
(RSCP) is defined and analyzed for characterizing the effect of16
the correlation between the COP and the SOP introduced by the17
corporate source–relay link. The reliability–security ratio (RSR)18
is introduced for characterizing the relationship between the re-19
liability and the security through asymptotic analysis. Moreover,20
the concept of effective secrecy throughput is defined as the21
product of the secrecy rate and of the RSCP for the sake of22
characterizing the overall efficiency of the system, as determined23
by the transmit SNR, the secrecy codeword rate, and the power24
sharing ratio between the relay and the jammer. The impact of25
the direct source–eavesdropper link and additional performance26
comparisons with respect to other related selection schemes are27
also included. Our numerical results show that the JRJS scheme28
outperforms the TBRS method both in terms of the RSCP and in29
terms of its effective secrecy throughput, but it is more sensitive to30
the feedback delays. Increasing the transmit signal-to-noise ratio31
(SNR) will not always improve the overall throughput. Moreover,32
the RSR results demonstrate that, upon reducing the CSI feedback33
delays, the reliability improves more substantially than the secu-34
rity degrades, implying an overall improvement in terms of the35
security–reliability tradeoff. Additionally, the secrecy throughput36
loss due to the second-hop feedback delay is more pronounced37
than that due to the first-hop one.38
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I. INTRODUCTION 42
43W IRELESS communications systems are particularly 4vulnerable to security attacks because of the inherent 45
openness of the transmission medium. Traditionally, the infor- 46
mation privacy of wireless networks has been focused on the 47
higher layers of the protocol stack employing cryptographically 48
secure schemes. However, these methods typically assume a 49
limited computing power for the eavesdroppers and exhibit 50
inherent vulnerabilities in terms of the inevitable secret key 51
distribution and management [1]. In recent years, physical 52
layer security (PLS) has emerged as a promising technique of 53
improving the confidentiality wireless communications, which 54
exploits the time-varying properties of fading channels, instead 55
of relying on conventional cryptosystems. The pivotal idea of 56
PLS solutions is to exploit the dynamically fluctuating random 57
nature of radio channels for maximizing the uncertainty con- 58
cerning the source messages at the eavesdropper [2], [3]. 59
To achieve this target, several PLS-enhancement approaches 60
have been proposed in the literature, including secrecy- 61
enhancing channel coding [4], secure on–off transmission de- 62
signs [5], secrecy-improving beamforming (BF)/precoding, and 63
artificial-noise-aided techniques relying on multiple antennas 64
[6], as well as secure relay-assisted transmission techniques [7]. 65
Specifically, apart from improving the reliability and coverage 66
of wireless transmissions, user cooperation also has a great 67
potential in terms of enhancing the wireless security against 68
eavesdropping attacks. There has been a growing interest in 69
improving the security of cooperative networks at the physical 70
layer [8]–[14]. To explore the spatial diversity potential of the 71
relaying networks and to boost the secrecy capacity (the differ- 72
ence between the channel capacity of the legitimate main link 73
and that of the eavesdropping link), most of the existing work 74
has been focused on secrecy-enhancing BF [8], [9], as well as 75
on intelligent relay node/jammer node (RN/JN) selection, etc. 76
Notably, given the availability of multiple relays, appropriately 77
designed RN/JN selection is capable of achieving a signifi- 78
cant security improvement for cooperative networks, which is 79
emerging as a promising research topic. In particular, Zou et al. 80
investigated both amplify-and-forward (AF)- and decode-and- 81
forward (DF)-based optimal relay selection conceived for 82
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enhancing the PLS in cooperative wireless networks [10], [11],83
where the global channel state information (CSI) of both the84
main link and the eavesdropping link was assumed to be avail-85
able. Similarly, jamming techniques, which impose artificial86
interference on the eavesdropper, have also attracted substantial87
attention [12]–[14]. More specifically, several sophisticated88
joint relay and jammer selection (JRJS) schemes were proposed89
in [12], where the beneficially selected relay increases the reli-90
ability of the main link, whereas the carefully selected jammer91
imposes interference on the eavesdropper and simultaneously92
protects the legitimate destination from interference. In [13]93
and [14], cooperative jamming has been studied in the context94
of bidirectional scenarios, and efficient RN/JN selection criteria95
have been developed for achieving improved secrecy rates with96
the aid of multiple relays. Furthermore, more effective relaying97
and jamming schemes, when taking the information leakage98
of the source–eavesdropper link into consideration, have been99
presented lately in [15] and [16].100
Nevertheless, an idealized assumption of the previously re-101
ported research on PLS is the availability of perfect channel102
state information (CSI), which is regarded as a stumbling block103
in the way of invoking practical secrecy-enhancing Wyner104
coding, on–off design, BF/precoding, and RN/JN selection.105
However, this idealized simplifying assumption is not realistic,106
since practical channel estimation imposes CSI imperfections,107
which are aggravated by the feedback delay, limited-rate feed-108
back, and channel estimation errors (CEEs) [17]. Generally, the109
related research has been focused on the issues of robust secure110
BF design from an average secrecy-rate-based optimization111
perspective for point-to-point multiantenna aided channels and112
relay channels [18], [19] supporting delay-tolerant systems.113
For systems imposing stringent delay constraints, particularly114
in imperfect CSI scenarios, perfect secrecy cannot always be115
achieved. Hence, the secrecy-outage-based characterization of116
systems is more appropriate, which provides a probabilistic117
performance measure of secure communication. The concept118
of secrecy outage was adopted in [20] for characterizing the119
probability of having both reliable and secure transmission,120
which, however, is inapplicable for the imperfect CSI case and121
fails to distinguish a connection outage from the secrecy outage.122
In [21], an alternative secrecy outage formulation is proposed123
for characterizing the attainable security level and provided124
a general framework for designing transmission schemes that125
meet specific target security requirements. To quantify both the126
reliability and security performance at both the legitimate and127
eavesdropper nodes separately, two types of outages, namely,128
the connection outage probability (COP) and the secrecy outage129
probability (SOP) are introduced. Then, considering the impact130
of time delay caused by the antenna selection process at the131
legitimate receiver, Hu et al. [22] proposed a new secure132
transmission scheme in the multiinput multioutput multieaves-133
dropper wiretap channel. Much recently, considering the out-134
dated CSI from the legitimate receiver, a new secure on–off135
transmission scheme was proposed for enhancing the secrecy136
throughput in [23].137
Moreover, prior studies of the outage-based secure trans-138
mission design are limited to single-antenna-assisted single-139
hop systems and have not been considered for cooperative140
relaying systems. Hence, the issues of secure transmissions 141
over cooperative relaying channels expressed in terms of the 142
SOP, COP, and secrecy throughput constitute an open problem. 143
On the other hand, apart from CEE, the CSI feedback delay 144
results in critical challenges for the PLS of cooperative relaying 145
systems, particularly when considering the specifics of RN/JN 146
selection. In [15], the effects of outdated CSI knowledge con- 147
cerning the legitimate links on the ergodic secrecy rate achieved 148
by the proposed secure transmission strategy in the context 149
of DF relaying is investigated. The impact of CSI feedback 150
delay on the secure relay and jammer selection conceived for 151
DF relaying was investigated in [24], albeit only in terms 152
of the SOP. In our previous study [25], we considered the 153
secure transmission design and the secrecy performance of an 154
opportunistic DF system relying on outdated CSI, where only a 155
single relay is invoked. Additionally, during the revision of this 156
work, we investigated the security performance for outdated AF 157
relay selection in [26]. Therefore, in this treatise, we extend 158
our investigations to the PLS of multiple AF relaying assisted 159
networks relying on RN/JN selection. 160
Explicitly, we focus our attention on the outage-based char- 161
acterization of secure transmissions in cooperative relay-aided 162
networks relying on realistic CSI feedback delay. To exploit the 163
multirelay induced diversity gain and the associated jamming 164
capabilities, joint AF relay node and jammer node selection 165
is employed by the relay–destination link. We assume that, in 166
line with the practical reality, the instantaneous eavesdropper’s 167
CSI is unavailable at the legitimate transmitter and that the 168
RN/JN selections are performed based on the outdated CSI of 169
the main links. Two types of cooperative strategies are invoked 170
by our cooperative network operating under secrecy constraints, 171
namely, the traditional best relay selection (TBRS) strategy and 172
the JRJS strategy. Specifically, the main contributions of this 173
paper can be summarized as follows. 174
175
• We develop an outage-based characterization for quan- 176
tifying both the reliability and security performance of 177
a two-hop AF relaying system. Specifically, in contrast 178
to [21] and [22], we propose the novel definition of 179
the reliable and secure connection probability (RSCP). 180
Explicitly, closed-form expressions of the COP, the SOP, 181
and the RSCP are derived for both the TBRS and for our 182
JRJS strategies. Numerical results demonstrate that the 183
JRJS scheme outperforms the TBRS scheme in terms of 184
its RSCP. 185
• We also introduce the reliability–security ratio (RSR) 186
for characterizing their direct relationship by a single 187
parameter through the asymptotic analysis of the COP and 188
the SOP in the high-SNR regime. We derive the RSR for 189
both the TBRS and JRJS strategies for investigating the 190
effect of secrecy codeword rate setting, as well as that 191
of the feedback delay and that of the power sharing ratio 192
between the relay and the jammer on the RSR. 193
• We then modify the definition of effective secrecy 194
throughput by multiplying the secrecy rate with the RSCP, 195
which results in an optimization problem of the trans- 196
mit signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), secrecy codeword rate, 197
and power sharing between the relay and the jammer. 198
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Fig. 1. Cooperative relaying network assisted by multiple relays in the pres-
ence of an eavesdropper.
It is shown that, compared with the TBRS strategy,199
JRJS achieves a significantly higher effective secrecy200
throughput, and the corresponding throughput loss is201
more sensitive to feedback delays. The impact of the di-202
rect source–eavesdropper link and additional throughput203
performance comparisons with respect to other related204
selection schemes are further discussed.205
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.206
Section II introduces our system model and describes both207
the TBRS and our JRJS strategies. In Sections III and IV,208
we present the mathematical framework of our performance209
analysis both for the TBRS strategy and for the JRJS strategy,210
respectively, including the COP, the SOP, the RSCP, the RSR,211
and the effective secrecy throughput. Our numerical results212
and discussions are provided in Section V. Finally, Section VI213
presents our concluding remarks.214
II. SYSTEM MODEL215
A. System Description216
Consider a cooperative relaying network consisting of a217
source S, a destination D, Kr relays Rk, k = 1, . . . ,Kr, and218
an eavesdropper E, as shown in Fig. 1, where all nodes are219
equipped with a single transmit antenna (TA), except for the220
source, which has Nt TAs. The cooperative relay architecture221
in Fig. 1 is generally applicable to diverse practical wireless222
systems in the presence of an eavesdropper, including the223
family of wireless sensor networks (WSNs), mobile ad hoc224
networks (MANETs), and the long-term evolution advanced225
cellular systems [11].226
To exploit the diversity potential of multiple relay nodes over227
independently fading channels, AF relay/jammer selection is228
employed. All relays operate in the half-duplex AF mode, and229
data transmission is performed in two phases. More particu-230
larly, during the broadcast phase, the source node transmits its231
signal to a selected relay with the aid of BF, which is invoked232
for forwarding the signal received from S to D. An inherent233
assumption is that the transmit BF weights are based on the234
CSI estimates quantified and fed back by the selected relay.235
During the cooperative phase, a pair of appropriately selected236
relays transmit toward D and E, respectively. A conventional237
relay (denoted by R∗) forwards the source’s message to the 238
destination. Another relay (denoted by J∗) operates in the 239
“jammer mode” and imposes intentional interference upon E in 240
order confuse it. However, D is unable to mitigate the artificial 241
interference emanating from the jammer node J∗ due to its 242
critical secrecy constraints [12]. It should be noted that both 243
the process of RN/JN selection and the feedback of the transmit 244
BF weights from R∗ to S may impose a time lag between the 245
data transmission and the channel estimation. These time delays 246
are denoted by TdSR and TdRD , respectively. Furthermore, we 247
assume that the BF and RN/JN selection process is based 248
on the perfectly estimated but outdated CSI. We employ the 249
first-order autoregressive outdated CSI model of [20], while 250
relying on the correlation coefficients of ρSR = J0(2πfdTdSR) 251
and ρRD = J0(2πfdTdRD) for the two hops, where J0(·) is 252
the zero-order Bessel function of the first kind, and fd is the 253
Doppler frequency. 254
A slow flat block Rayleigh fading environment is assumed, 255
where the channel remains static for the coherence interval (one 256
slot) and changes independently in different coherence inter- 257
vals, as denoted by hi,j ∼ CN (0, σ2i,j), i, j ∈ {S,R, J,D,E}. 258
The direct communication links are assumed to be unavailable 259
due to the presence of obstructions between S and D, as well 260
as the eavesdropper.1 This assumption follows the rationale of 261
[12] and has been routinely exploited in previous literature (see 262
[27] and [28] and the references therein), where the source 263
and relays belong to the same cluster, whereas the destination 264
and the eavesdropper are located in another. More specifically, 265
this assumption is particularly valid in networks with broadcast 266
and unicast transmission, where each terminal is a legitimate 267
receiver for one signal and acts as an eavesdropper for some 268
other signal. Therefore, the security concerns are only related 269
to the cooperative relay-aided channel. Furthermore, additive 270
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) is assumed with zero mean 271
and unit variance N0. Let Pi be the transmit power of node 272
i, and the instantaneous SNR of the i → j link is given by 273
γi,j = Pi|hi,j |2/N0. 274
We employ the constant-rate Wyner coding scheme for con- 275
structing wiretap codes of [2] to meet the PLS requirements 276
due to the fact that the accurate global CSI is not available. 277
Let C(R0, Rs, N) denote the set of all possible Wyner codes 278
of length N , where R0 is the codeword transmission rate, and 279
Rs is the confidential information rate (R0 > Rs). The positive 280
rate difference Re = R0 −Rs is the cost of providing secrecy 281
against the eavesdropper. A confidential message is encoded 282
into a codeword at S and then transmitted to D. 283
B. Secure Transmission 284
In the broadcast phase, S transmits its BF signal s(t) to the 285
selected relay R∗, where the relay selection is performed 286
before data transmission commences, and the selection cri- 287
terion will be detailed later in the context of the cooper- 288
ative phase. The transmit BF vector w(t|Td) is calculated 289
using the perfectly estimated but outdated CSI given by 290
1The case when the S → E link is introduced will be investigated separately
in Section VI.
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w(t|TdSR) = hHSR∗(t− Td)/|hSR∗(t− TdSR)| [29], where we291
have hSR∗(t) = [hSR∗,1(t), . . . , hSR∗,Nt(t)]T , and the signal292
received by the relay R∗ can be written as293
yR∗(t) =
√
Psw(t|Td)hSR∗(t)s(t) + nSR∗(t) (1)
where nSR∗(t) is the AWGN at the relay. Then, we can294
define the received SNR at the relay node as γSR =295
PS |w(t|TdSR)hSR∗(t)|2/N0.296
In the cooperative phase, we consider two RN/JN selection297
schemes performed by D: relay selection without jamming298
and JRJS.299
1) Traditional Best Relay Selection: The first category of so-300
lutions does not involve a jamming process, and therefore, only301
a conventional relay accesses the channel during the second302
phase of the protocol. The relay selection process is performed303
based on the highest instantaneous SNR of the second hop,304
which is formulated as305












where γ˜RkD is the instantaneous SNR in the relay selection306
process, and E[γRkE ] denotes the average SNR at E. We can307
model γRkD and γ˜RkD as two gamma distributed randomAQ1 308
variables having the correlation factor of ρ2RD.309
During the second phase, the received signal yR∗(t)310
is multiplied by a time-variant AF-relay gain G and311
retransmitted to D, where we have G =312 √
PR/(PS |wopt(t|TdSR)hSR∗(t)|2 +N0). After further math-313
ematical manipulations, the mutual information (MI) between314




































2) Joint Relay and Jammer Selection: Similarly, consider-316
ing the unavailability of the instantaneous CSI regarding the317
eavesdropper, we adopt a suboptimal RN/JN selection metric318
conditioned on the outdated CSI as319












where J∗ is selected for minimizing the interference imposed320
on D.321
It should be noted that, to have the same transmit power as322
that of the TBRS case, we assume that PR∗ + PJ∗ = PR for323
our JRJS strategy and introduce λ = PR∗/(PR∗ + PJ∗) as the324
ratio of the relay’s transmit power to the total power required 325
by the active relay and jammer. 326
In the cooperative phase, R∗ will also amplify the received 327
signal yR∗(t) by G and forward it to D. At the same time, the 328
jammer J∗ will generate intentional interference to confuse E, 329
which will also cause interference at D. Consequently, the MI 330














































Remark 1: Generally, the optimal RN/JN selection scheme 332
should take into account the global SNR knowledge set 333
{γSR, γRD, γRE}. However, given the potentially excessive 334
implementational complexity overhead of the optimal selection 335
schemes and the unavailability of the global CSI, we employ 336
suboptimal selection schemes as in [12].2 Furthermore, it is 337
commonly assumed that the average SNR of the eavesdropper 338
is available at the transmitter, which seems, somehow, not 339
reasonable. However, as stated in most of the literature, such as 340
[12]–[22], [24]–[28], and [30], provided that the eavesdropper 341
belongs to the network, which is also the case in our paper, 342
the related assumption might still be deemed reasonably. Addi- 343
tionally, as in [8], [11], [12], and [24], for mathematical conve- 344
nience, we assume that the relaying channels are independent 345
and identically distributed and that we have E[γSRk ] = γ¯SR, 346
E[γRkD] = γ¯RD, and E[γRkE ] = γ¯RE . The distances between 347
the relays are assumed to be much smaller than the distances 348
between relays and source/destination/eavesdropper; hence, the 349
corresponding path losses among the different relays are ap- 350
proximately the same. This assumption is reasonable both for 351
WSNs and for MANETs associated with a symmetric clustered 352
relay configuration, and it may be also satisfied as valid by 353
classic cellular systems in a statistical sense [11]. 354
III. SECURE TRANSMISSION WITHOUT JAMMING 355
Here, we endeavor to characterize both the reliability and 356
security performance comprehensively of the TBRS scheme. 357
We first derive closed-form expressions for both the COP and 358
the SOP. Then, the RSR is introduced through the asymptotic 359
analysis of the COP and the SOP. Furthermore, we propose 360
the novel definition of the RSCP and the effective secrecy 361
throughput. 362
2To further alleviate the cooperation-related overhead, the selection criterion
is based on the R→ D link, since the second hop plays a dominant role in
determining the received SNR, because the first hop corresponds to a multiple-
input–single-output channel with the aid of multiple antennas, and hence, it is
more likely to be better than the second hop. The optimal selection based on
both hops is beyond the scope of this work.
WANG et al.: JOINT RELAY AND JAMMER SELECTION IMPROVES THE PLS IN THE FACE OF FEEDBACK DELAYS 5
A. COP and SOP363
When the perfect instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper’s364
channel and even the legitimate users’ channel is unavailable,365
alternative definitions of the outage probability may be adopted366
for the statistical characterization of the attainable secrecy367
performance, particularly for delay-limited applications. Based368
on [31, Def. 2], perfect secrecy cannot be achieved, when we369
have Re < IE , where IE denotes the MI between the source370
and the eavesdropper. Encountering this event is termed as a371
secrecy outage. Furthermore, the destination is unable to flaw-372
lessly decode the received codewords when R0 > ID , which is373
termed as a connection outage. The grade of reliability and the374
grade of security maintained by a transmission scheme may be375
then quantified by the COP and the SOP, respectively.376
We continue by presenting our preliminary results versus the377
point-to-point SNRs. Let us denote the cumulative distribution378
function (CDF) and the probability density function (PDF) of a379
random variable X by FX(x) and fX(x), respectively. On one380
















γ¯NtSR(Nt − 1 − n)!
× xNt−1−ne −xγ¯SR (8)
whereas its CDF is given by382



















On the other hand, for the instantaneous SNR of the R →383
D hop, according to the principles of concomitants or induced384
order statistics, the CDF of γR∗D can be derived as in [32]385














Thus, the COP of the TBRS strategy is given by386









where we have γDth = 2











xz + x(x + 1)
z
)]
fγSR∗(z + x)dz. (12)
Consequently, by substituting (8) and (10) into (12) and using389






















































where we have ωk = (k(1 − ρ2RD) + 1)/(k + 1). Then, by 392












where we have γEth = 2
2(R0−Rs) − 1. Similarly, we may calcu- 395
late the CDF of γTBRSE in (14) as 396
FγTBRS
E








































Then, by substitutingx = γEth into (15), we can derivePTBRSso . 397
The COP and the SOP in (11) and (14) characterize the at- 398
tainable reliability and security performance, respectively, and 399
can be regarded as the detailed requirements of accurate system 400
design. From the definition of COP and SOP, it is clear that 401
the reliability of the main link can be improved by increasing 402
the transmit SNR (or decreasing its data rate) to reduce the 403
COP, which unfortunately increases the risk of eavesdropping. 404
Thus, a tradeoff between reliability and security may be struck, 405
despite the fact that closed-from expressions cannot be obtained 406
as in [11]. Furthermore, we denote the minimal reliability and 407
security requirements by υ and δ, where the feasible range of 408
the reliability constraint is 0 < υ < 1. Bearing in mind that 409
the COP is a monotonously increasing function of R0, the 410
corresponding threshold of the codeword transmission rate is 411
Rth0 = arg{PTBRSco (R0) = υ}, which leads to a lower bound of 412
the SOP, when we have (R0 −Rs) → Rth0 . Thus, the feasible 413
range of δ is PTBRSso (Rth0 , 0) < δ < 1. The preceding analysis 414
indicates that, given a reliability constraint υ, the lower bound 415
of the security constraint is determined. 416
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B. Reliability–Security Ratio417
Here, we will focus our attention on the asymptotic analysis418
of the COP and the SOP in the high-SNR regime. Then, inspired419
by [25], we introduce the concept of the RSR for characterizing420
the direct relationship between reliability and security.421
Proposition 1: Based on the asymptotic probabilities of Pco422
and Pso at high SNRs,3 the RSR is defined as423
Pco(R0) = Λ [1 − Pso(R0, Rs)] (16)
where Λ = limη→∞ Pco/(1 − Pso), which represents the im-424
provement in COP upon decreasing the SOP. More specifically,425
since the reduction of the SOP/COP must be followed by an426
improvement of COP/SOP, a lower Λ implies that, when the427
security is reduced, the reliability is improved, and vice versa.428
Thus, for the TBRS scheme studied earlier, the RSR is derived429
as (17), shown at the bottom of the page.430
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.431
Remark 2: It can be seen from the preceding expression432
that the factor Λ is independent of the transmit SNR, but433
directly depends on the channel gains, the rate pair (R0, Rs),434
and the number of TAs and relays. For a given Rs, reducing435
R0 to enhance the reliability may erode the security, because436
(R0 −Rs) is also reduced. Conversely, increasing R0 provides437
more redundancy for protecting the security of the information,438
but simultaneously, the reliability is reduced. Hence, the RSR439
analysis underlines an important point of view concerning how440
to balance the reliability versus security tradeoff by adjusting441
(R0, Rs). Furthermore, as long as a CSI feedback delay exists,442
the RSR has an intimate relationship with ρSR and ρRD . It is443
clear that the value ofΛTBRS decreases as ρRD increases, which444
is due to the fact that the relay selection process only improves445
the reliability of the legitimate user. On the other hand, since446








(k(1 − ρ2RD) + 1)) < 1, when σ2RD and σ2RE are comparable,448
ΛTBRS will be reduced as ρSR increases. This observation449
implies that, although both Pco and (1 − Pso) are reduced450
when the first-hop CSI becomes better, the improvement of451
3Assume equal power allocation between S and the relay, yielding PS =
PR = P , and define η = P/N0 as the transmit SNR [24].
the reliability is more substantial than the security loss, as ρSR 452
increases. 453
C. Effective Secrecy Throughput 454
It should be noted that the COP and SOP metrics ignore the 455
correlation between these two outage events. More specifically, 456
in contrast to the point-to-point transmission case, since the 457
S → R link’s SNR included in the MI expressions of (3) and 458
(4), the secrecy outage and the connection outage are definitely 459
not independent of each other. Therefore, it might be of limited 460
benefit in evaluating the reliability or the security separately. 461
We note furthermore that, although another metric referred to 462
as the secrecy throughput was introduced as the product of the 463
successful decoding probability and of the secrecy rate [21], 464
[22], this definition ignores the fact that a reliable transmission 465
may be insecure, and the SOP is not taken into consideration. 466
Hence, this metric is unable to holistically characterize the 467
efficiency of our scheme, while capable of achieving both re- 468
liable and secure transmission. Therefore, here, we redefine the 469
effective secrecy throughput as the probability of a successful 470
transmission (reliable and secure) multiplied by the secrecy 471
rate, namely, as ς = RsPR&S , where the RSCP is defined as 472
PR&S = Pr{ID > R0, IE < R0 −Rs}. (18)
Upon substituting the expressions of ID and IE in (3) and (4) 473
into (18), we can rewrite PR&S for the TBRS strategy in (19), 474
shown at the bottom of the page. 475
Finally, using the corresponding CDFs and PDFs of (8)–(10) 476
from our previous analysis, we can obtain PTBRSR&S in (20), 477
shown at the bottom of the next page, as well as the secrecy 478
throughput. 479
Furthermore, considering the asymptotic result for RSCP at 480
high SNRs in (20) by applying the approximation Kv(x) ≈ 481
(v − 1)!/2(x/2)v and closing the highest terms of η after 482
invoking the McLaurin series representation for the exponential 483
function, the asymptotic effective secrecy throughput can be 484
approximated as 485
Remark 3: Given the definition of COP, SOP, and the secrecy 486
throughput result of (21), shown at the bottom of the next page, 487
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PRS may be high (i.e., close to 1), the value of ς remains small.489
By contrast, if R0 is too large, the value of Pco is close to 1,490
and therefore, ς will also become small. This observation is491
also suitable for Rs. Thus, as pointed out in the RSR analysis,492
it is elusive to improve both the reliability and the security493
simultaneously, but both of them are equally crucial in terms494
of the effective secrecy throughput, which depends on the rate495
pair (R0, Rs).496
Additionally, (21) also reveals that increasing the SNR would497
drastically reduce the effective secrecy throughput. For high498
transmit SNRs, a high reliability can indeed be perfectly guar-499
anteed, but at the same time, the grade of the security is severely500
degraded. However, the probability of a reliable and simultane-501
ously secure transmission will tend toward zero. Hence, we may502
conclude that there exists an optimal SNR, which achieves the503
maximal secrecy throughput.504
In conclusion, adopting the appropriate code rate pair and505
transmit SNR is crucial for achieving the maximum effective506
secrecy throughput, which can be formulated as507
max
R0,Rs,η
ς(R0, Rs) = RsP
TBRS
R&S
s.t. Pco ≤ υ, Pso ≤ δ, 0 < Rs < R0 (22)
where υ and δ denote the system’s reliability and security508
requirements. Unfortunately, it is quite a challenge to find509
the closed-form optimal solution to this problem due to the510
complexity of the expressions. Although suboptimal solutions511
can be found numerically (with the aid of gradient-based search512
techniques), the secrecy throughput optimization problem and513
the corresponding complexity analysis and performance com-514
parisons are beyond the scope of this work.515
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION WITH JAMMING516
Here, we consider the extension of the aforementioned relay517
selection approaches to systems additionally invoking relay-518
aided jamming. JRJS is based on the outdated but perfectly 519
estimated CSI, and the details have been presented in Section II. 520
We would also like to investigate the security performance 521
from an outage-based perspective. The COP, SOP, RSCP, and 522
effective secrecy throughput will be included. 523
A. COP and SOP 524
It is plausible that the main differences between the JRJS and 525
TBRS schemes are determined by the instantaneous SNR of the 526
R → D hop, where, now, a jammer is included. Based on our 527
preliminary results detailed for the point-to-point SNRs in (8) 528
and (10), we now focus our attention on the statistical analysis 529
of the SNR, including J∗. As stated for the JRJS scheme in 530
Section II, J∗ corresponds to the lowest γ˜RkD and is selected 531
from the set {R −R∗}. Recalling that R∗ is the best relay 532
of the second hop, we have γ˜J∗D = minRk∈R−R∗{γ˜RkD} Δ= 533
minRk∈R{γ˜RkD} for Kr > 1. Using the induced order statis- 534
tics, the corresponding CDF of γR∗D is presented in (10), 535







[(Kr − 1) (1 − ρ2RD) + 1] γ¯JD
. (23)
Although the relay and jammer selection processes are not 537
entirely disjoint, we may exploit the assumption that γR∗D and 538
γJ∗D are independent of each other, which is valid when the 539
number of relays is sufficiently high, as justified in [24]. Let us 540
define the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the second 541
hop as ξD = γR∗D/(γJ∗D + 1), using (10) and (23), whose 542
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As far as the eavesdropper is concerned, γR∗E and γJ∗E545
are independent and exponentially distributed. Furthermore, for546
ξE = γR∗E/(γJ∗E + 1), we have547






where φ = λ/(1 − λ). According to the definition of COP and548
SOP in Section III-A, we can obtain the following closed-form549
approximations of the COP and the SOP.4550
Lemma 1: The COP and the SOP of the JRJS strategy551
associated with feedback delays are approximated by552























































where ϕˆk = Krλωkησ2RD/([(Kr − 1)(1 − ρ2RD) + 1](1 −553
λ)ησ2RD +Kr), and554






























Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.555
The feasible range of the reliability constraint is similar to556
that of the TBRS strategy, and hence, it is omitted here.557
B. Reliability–Security Ratio558
Lemma 2: Recalling the definition in Section III, the RSR559
for the JRJS strategy may be expressed in (28), shown at the560
bottom of the page.561
4When we have λ→ 1, (24) will degenerate into the TBRS case seen in
(10). The performance analysis of the JRJS will be presented separately in the
following, since several approximations have to be included.
It can be seen from the previous expression that, in contrast 562
to the analysis of the TBRS strategy operating without jam- 563
ming, for a fixed SNR threshold, the CDF of the second-hop 564
SNR will converge to a nonzero limit. We also find that this 565
limit is determined by the power sharing ratio between the 566
relay and the jammer. Furthermore, according to the analy- 567
sis of the TBRS strategy, for η → ∞, we have FγSR∗ (x) → 568
0. Thus, by exploiting the tight upper bound that γTBRSD ≤ 569
min{γSR, γR∗D} and γTBRSE ≤ min{γSR, γR∗E}, we have 570
P JRJS,∞co →FγξD (γDth) and 1−P JRJS,∞so →FγξE (γEth). Finally, 571
substituting the corresponding results into (16), we arrive at the 572
RSR of the JRJS strategy. 573
Remark 4: It can be seen from the RSR expression of (28) 574
again that the rate-pair setting (R0, Rs) has an inconsistent 575
influence on the RSR, and hence, we have to carefully adjust R0 576
and Rs to balance the reliability versus security performance. 577
Let us now focus our attention on the differences between the 578
JRJS scheme and the TBRS arrangement. 579
First, we may find that the power sharing ratio λ between 580
the relay and the jammer plays a very important role. The 581
optimization of λ will be investigated from an effective secrecy 582
throughput optimization point of view in the following. 583
Second, it is plausible that, in contrast to the behavior of the 584
TBRS strategy, ΛJRJS of (28) is only related to the delay of the 585
second hop, but it is still a monotonically decreasing function of 586
ρRD . This implies that the improvement of the channel quality 587
of the JRJS will achieve a more pronounced COP improvement 588
than the associated SOP improvement. Furthermore, recalling 589
that the RSR is considered in the high-SNR region, it has no 590
dependence on the first hop quality. This is due to the fact that 591
if the first-hop channel quality is sufficiently high for ensuring 592
a successful transmission, the asymptotic CDFs of ξD and ξE 593
in (29) and (30) associated with η → ∞ will converge to a AQ2594
nonzero limit at high SNRs, which ultimately dominates the 595
COP and the SOP. 596
C. Effective Secrecy Throughput 597
Before proceeding to the effective secrecy throughput analy- 598
sis, we also have to investigate the RSCP. 599
Lemma 3: The RSCP of our JRJS strategy may be approxi- 600
mated as in (31), shown at the bottom of the next page, where 601
we have θ1,k = (γDth(γDth + 1))/(γDth + ϕˆk), θ2 = γDth − γEth + 602
(γEth(γ
E
th+1)/(γEth+ φˆ)), and φˆ=λησ2RE/((1−λ)ησ2RE + 1). 603
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C. 604
Apart from the rate pair (R0, Rs), the aforementionedP JRJSR&S 605
of (31) is also a function of the power sharing ratio λ between 606
the selected relay and the jammer. 607
Given the complexity of the RSCP expression, it is quite 608









) (−1)kKr [(Kr − 1) (1 − ρ2RD)+ 1] [(λ−1 − 1)(22(R0−Rs) − 1)+ 1]
[(Kr − 1) (1 − ρ2RD) + 1] (k + 1)(λ−1 − 1)(22R0 − 1) +Kr [k (1 − ρ2RD) + 1]
(28)
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effective secrecy throughput that max0<λ<1 ς = RsP JRJSR&S . Al-610
ternatively, we can focus on the asymptotic analysis in the high-611
SNR region and try to find a general closed-form solution for λ.612
Specifically, when we have η → ∞, P JRJSR&S will be dominated613
by the channel quality of the second hop; hence, we have614


















where the approximation is based on the fact that, in contrast to615
bothFξD (γDth) and FξE (γEth), which converge to a nonzero limit616
regardless of η, the first hop’s FγSR(x) will tend to zero, and617
hence, it can be neglected. Substituting the asymptotic results618
of (29) and (30) into (33), we can obtain P JRJS,∞R&S . In contrast to619
the TBRS case operating without jamming, as the SNR tends to620
∞, the RSCP will tend to a nonzero value and, upon increasing621
the transmit SNR beyond a certain limit, will no longer increase622
the effective secrecy throughput.623
Then, based on (32), we arrive at the approximated optimal624
value λopt, which is the solution of the following equation:625
∂P JRJS,∞R&S (R0, Rs, λ)
∂λ
= 0. (33)
Then, by exploiting the approximation of [k(1 − ρ2RD) + 1]/626
(k + 1) ≈ 1 − ρ2RD in (29) for a large ρRD (practically, the CSI627







where γth = (22R0 − 1)(22(R0−Rs) − 1). It is clear that this629
value is determined by the number of relays and (R0, Rs).630
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS631
Both our numerical and Monte Carlo simulation results are632
presented here for verifying the theoretical PLS performance633
analysis of the multiple-relay-aided network under CSI feed-634
Fig. 2. COP and SOP versus transmit SNR for the TBRS and JRJS strategies
in conjunction with different rate pairs, for Nt = Kr = 3, fdTd = 0.1, and
λ = 1/10.
back delays. Explicitly, the COP, SOP, RSCP, and RSR are 635
validated for both the TBRS and JRJS strategies. Furthermore, 636
the effects of feedback delays and system parameters (including 637
the transmission rate pair (R0, Rs) and the power sharing ratio 638
λ between the relay and the jammer) on the achievable effective 639
secrecy throughput are evaluated. The Rayleigh fading model 640
is employed for characterizing all communication links in our 641





RE = 1, and used TdSR = TdRD = Td. 643
Fig. 2 plots the COP and the SOP versus the transmit SNR for 644
both the TBRS and JRJS strategies in conjunction with different 645
rate pairs. The analytical lines are plotted by using (11) and (14) 646
for the TBRS strategy and by using (26) and (27) for the JRJS 647
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Fig. 3. SOP versus COP for the TBRS and JRJS strategies with different
feedback delays for Nt = Kr = 3, Rs = R0/8, and λ = 1/10.
case, respectively. It can be clearly seen from the figure that the648
analytical and simulated outage probability curves match well,649
which confirms the accuracy of the mathematical analysis. As650
expected, compared with the TBRS strategy, the SOP of the651
JRJS strategy is much better, whereas the COP is worse. We652
can also find that both the COP and the SOP will converge to an653
outage floor at high SNRs for the JRJS strategy. The reason for654
this is that the jammer also imposes interference on the destina-655
tion and the interference inflicted increases with the SNR. Thus,656
the designers have to take into account the tradeoff between657
the reliability and the security and the interference imposed on658
D, particularly when considering the JRJS strategy. Moreover,659
we can observe in Fig. 2 that increasing the transmission rate660
decreases the COP and increases the SOP.661
Fig. 3 further characterizes the SOP versus COP for both the662
TBRS and JRJS strategies based on the numerical results in663
Fig. 2, which shows the tradeoff between the reliability and the664
security. It can be seen from the figure that the SOP decreases as665
the COP increases, and for a specific COP, the SOP of the JRJS666
scheme is strictly lower than that of TBRS. This confirms that667
the JRJS scheme performs better than the conventional TBRS668
scheme. Furthermore, the CSI feedback delay will also degrade669
the system tradeoff performance.670
Fig. 4 illustrates the RSCP versus transmit SNR for the671
TBRS strategy in the context of different network configura-672
tions, including different rate pairs, different number of relays,673
and both perfect and outdated CSI feedback scenarios. The674
analytical lines are plotted by using the approximation in (20).675
We may conclude from the figure that the rate-pair setting676
(R0, Rs) determines both the reliability and security transmis-677
sion performance. These curves also show that the RSCP is a678
concave function of the transmit SNR, whereas the continued679
boosting of the SNR would only decrease the probability of680
a successful transmission. We can observe from Fig. 4 that,681
Fig. 4. RSCP versus transmit SNR for the TBRS strategy with different rate
pairs for Nt = Kr = 3, fdTd = 0.1.
Fig. 5. RSCP versus transmit SNR for the JRJS strategy for different
power sharing ratios λ and for Nt = Kr = 3, fdTd = 0.1, and R0 = 1,
Rs = R0/8.
for a high transmit SNR, total reliability can be guaranteed, 682
whereas the associated grade of security is severely eroded. 683
Furthermore, increasing the number of relays and decreasing 684
the feedback delay will improve both the reliability and security 685
performance. 686
The RSCP of the JRJS strategy is presented in Fig. 5 for 687
different power sharing ratios between relaying and jamming. 688
Both the integration form (45) and the approximated closed 689
form in (31) match well with the Monte Carlo simulations. 690
The performance of the TBRS strategy is also included for 691
comparison. The JRJS scheme outperforms the TBRS operating 692
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Fig. 6. RSR versus feedback delay coefficient (R0 = 1, Rs = R0/8, λ =
3/4) and power sharing ratio λ (Rs = R0/8, ρSR = ρRD = 0.9) for the
TBRS and JRJS strategies, with Nt = Kr = 3.
without jamming under the scenario considered when encoun-693
tering comparable relay–destination and relay–eavesdropper694
channels. For some extreme configurations (when the relay–695
eavesdropper links are comparatively weak), this statement696
may not hold, but this scenario is beyond the scope of this697
paper. The maximum RSCP appears at about η = 15 dB698
for the JRJS strategy using λ = 3/4, whereas it is η = 10 dB699
for the TBRS strategy. Furthermore, as expected, increasing the700
number of available relays and jamming nodes will always be701
able to improve the reliability and security performance. How-702
ever, the continued boosting of the jammer’s power (decreasing703
λ) will not always improve the overall performance, because704
the interference improves initially the security, but then, it starts705
to reduce the reliability as λ decreases. This further motivates706
the designer to carefully take into account the power sharing707
between relaying and jamming. The effect of the rate-pair708
setting on the security and reliability of the JRJS strategy is709
neglected here, which follows a similar trend to that of the710
TBRS strategy.711
Fig. 6 characterizes the RSR versus feedback delay and712
power sharing ratio for both TBRS and JRJS, in which the713
RSR curves are plotted by using (17) and (28), respectively.714
The first illustration shows that the RSR decreases as the delay715
coefficients (ρSR and ρRD), which confirms that the im-716
provement of reliability becomes more pronounced than the717
reduction of the security as the feedback delay decreases.718
This observation implies an improvement in terms of the719
security–reliability tradeoff. In addition, the RSR versus ρRD720
is larger than that of ρSR, which indicates that the impact of the721
second-hop CSI feedback delay is more prominent. The other722
illustration in the right demonstrates that the RSR is a concave723
function of the power sharing ratio, which reflects the tradeoff724
between the reliability and the security struck by adjusting λ.725
Fig. 7. Percentage secrecy throughput loss versus delay coefficients with
Nt = Kr = 3, R0 = 1, Rs = R0/8, λ = 3/4, and η = 10 dB.
Fig. 8. Secrecy throughput versus R0 and κ = Rs/R0 for both the TBRS
and JRJS strategies with Nt = Kr = 3, fdTd = 0.1, and η = 15 dB.
To further evaluate the effect of feedback delays on the 726
secrecy performance, Fig. 7 plots the resultant percentage of 727





It can be seen from the figure that, compared with the TBRS 729
scheme, JRJS is more sensitive to the feedback delays. Further- 730
more, recalling that increasing the delay coefficient ρSR of the 731
first hop improves the reliability, but at the same time also helps 732
the eavesdropper, it is not surprising that the secrecy throughput 733
loss due to the second-hop feedback delay is more pronounced. 734
Fig. 8 illustrates the achievable effective secrecy throughput 735
for both the TBRS and JRJS strategies versus the codeword 736
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Fig. 9. Secrecy throughput versus R0 and λ for the JRJS strategy with Nt =
Kr = 3, fdTd = 0.1, η = 15 dB, and Rs/R0 = 1/8.
transmission rate R0 and the secrecy code ratio κ = Rs/R0737
with no outage constraints (υ = δ = 1). The values of the738
effective secrecy throughput are plotted by using ς = RsPR&S .739
We can observe in Fig. 8 that, subject to a fixed code rate740
ratio κ, the effective secrecy throughput increases to a peak741
value as R0 reaches its optimal value and then decreases. This742
phenomenon can be explained as follows. At a low transmission743
rate, although the COP increases with R0, which has a negative744
effect on the effective secrecy throughput, both the secrecy745
rate and the SOP performance will benefit. However, after746
reaching the optimal R0, the effective secrecy throughput drops747
since the main link cannot afford a reliable transmission, and748
the resultant COP increase becomes dominant. On the other749
hand, subject to a fixed R0 (which results in a constant COP),750
the effective secrecy throughput is also a concave function751
of κ, and increasing the code rate ratio ultimately results752
in an increased secrecy information rate at the cost of an753
increased SOP.754
The achievable effective secrecy throughput for the JRJS755
strategy is also presented in Fig. 8, and similar conclusions and756
trends can be observed to that of the TBRS case. Additionally,757
the comparison of the two strategies indicates that the JRJS758
scheme attains a higher effective secrecy throughput than the759
TBRS scheme operating without jamming, even if no power760
sharing optimization has been employed.761
Fig. 9 further illustrates the impact of power sharing between762
the relay and the jammer on the achievable effective secrecy763
throughput of the JRJS strategy versus R0 in the absence of764
outage constraints. Given a fixed code rate pair (R0, Rs), the765
effective secrecy throughput follows the trend of the RSCP,766
which is a concave function of λ, as shown in Fig. 6. The767
interference introduced by the jammer initially improves both768
the reliability and the security as λ increases, but this trend is769
reversed beyond a certain point.770
Fig. 10. Comparisons for different strategies with and without the S–E link,
for Nt = Kr = 3, R0 = 1, Rs = R0/8, fdTd = 0.1, and λ = 3/4.
VI. DISCUSSION 771
A. Impact of the S–E Link 772
We note that the introduction of the S–E link, i.e., the 773
information leakage in the first phase, is very critical to the 774
security. There are also some research studies focusing on 775
the corresponding secure transmission design and performance 776
evaluation for cooperative networks with the S–E link, such 777
as [15] and [16]. Here, we assume that the eavesdropper can 778
receive information directly from the source in the first phase. 779
Thus, following the steps in the prior sections, for the TBRS 780
and JRJS schemes, it is clear that the SNR experienced at the 781
eavesdropper should be rewritten as 782
γ˜τE = γSE + γ
τ
E (36)
where γSE = Ps|wopt(t|TdSR)hSE(t)|2/N0 follows the ex- 783
ponential distribution with the average value γ¯SE , τ = 784
{TBRS, JRJS}, and γτE has been defined in (4) and (7). 785
Then, the corresponding SOP, RSCP, and effective secrecy 786
throughput have to be reconsidered. Unfortunately, to the best 787
of our knowledge, it is a mathematically intractable problem 788
to obtain closed-form results for the related performance eval- 789
uations. Therefore, we resorted to numerical simulations for 790
further investigating the impact of the S–E link. Fig. 10 com- 791
pares the effective secrecy throughput of the TBRS and JRJS 792
schemes both with and without considering the direct S–E 793
link. It becomes clear that the information leakage in the first 794
phase will lead to a severe security performance degradation, 795
particularly for the JRJS scheme, which will no longer be 796
capable of maintaining a steady throughput at high SNRs. The 797
reason for this trend is that increasing the transmit SNR will 798
help the eavesdropper in the presence of the direct S–E link. 799
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B. Comparisons800
Here, based on the outdated CSI assumption, we provide per-801
formance comparisons with a range of other schemes advocated802
in [12] with the aid of the proposed outage-based characteriza-803
tion. Fig. 10 also incorporates our effective secrecy throughput804
performance comparison, where the optimal selection (OS)805
regime and the optimal selection combined with jamming (OSJ)806
were proposed in [12]. They are formulated as807




















where γ˜RkE is the delayed version of the instantaneous CSI of808
the R–E link. It should be noted that this constitutes an entirely809
new performance characterization of these schemes from the810
perspective of the effective secrecy throughput. It is shown in811
Fig. 1 that the selection combined with jamming outperforms812
the corresponding nonjamming techniques at high SNRs, albeit813
this trend may no longer prevail at low SNRs. In comparison,814
compared with those selections relying on the average SNRs of815
the R–E link, the optimal selections relying on the idealized816
simplifying assumptions of having global CSI (OS and OSJ817
schemes) knowledge can only achieve throughput gains at high818
SNRs due to the inevitable feedback delay.819
VII. CONCLUSION820
An outage-based characterization of cooperative relay net-821
works has been provided in the face of CSI feedback delays.822
Two types of relaying strategies were considered, namely, the823
TBRS strategy and the JRJS strategy. Closed-form expressions824
of the COP, the SOP, and the RSCP, as well as of the RSR,825
were derived. The RSR results demonstrated that the reliability826
is improved more substantially than the security performance827
when the CSI feedback delays are reduced. Furthermore, we828
presented a modified effective secrecy throughput definition829
and demonstrated that the JRJS strategy achieves a significant830
effective secrecy throughput gain over the TBRS strategy. The831
transmit SNR, the secrecy codeword rate setting, and the power832
sharing ratio between the relay and jammer nodes play impor-833
tant roles in striking a balance between the reliability and the834
security in terms of the secrecy throughput. The impact of the835
direct S–E link and the performance comparisons with other836
selection schemes were also included. Additionally, our results837
demonstrate that JRJS is more sensitive to the feedback delays838
and that the secrecy throughput loss due to the second-hop839
feedback delay is more pronounced than that due to the first-840
hop one.841
APPENDIX A842
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1843
To simplify the asymptotic performance analysis, (3) can be844
expressed in a more mathematically tractable form by the com-845
monly used tight upper bound of γTBRSD ≤ min{γSR, γR∗D}846
and γTBRSE ≤ min{γSR, γR∗E}. When we have η → ∞, based 847
on the CDFs in (9) and (10) and closing the smallest order terms 848


































































where O(x) denotes the high-order infinitely small contribu- 850
tions as a function of x, and 851











1 − k + 1


























Then, applying the upper bound of the receiver SNR, we may 852
rewrite the COP and the SOP of the TBRS strategy at high 853
SNRs as 854






























and according to the fact that γR∗E is exponentially distributed, 855
we have 856























Finally, substituting (41) and (42) into the definition of RSR 857
in (16), we can obtain (17). 858
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APPENDIX B859
PROOF OF LEMMA 1860
According to the description of COP and SOP, replacing861
FγR∗D (x) andFγR∗E (x) byFξD (x) andFξE (x) in (12) and (14)862
will involve a mathematically intractable integration of the form863











which, to the best of our knowledge, does not have a closed-864
form solution. Alternatively, bearing in mind that the preceding865
integration has a great matter with ξD, we now focus our866
attention on the approximation of ξD. Based on the PDF867
results in (23), it may be seen that γJ∗D obeys an exponential868
distribution. Then, we can approximate γˆJ∗D = γJ∗D + 1 by869
the exponential distribution as well, with an average value870
of E{γˆJ∗D} = ([(Kr − 1)(1 − ρ2RD) + 1]γ¯RD +Kr)/Kr by871
assuming that the AWGN term “1” is part of the stochastic872
mean terms. The approximation based on this method provides873
a very accurate analysis, and the accuracy of this method is874
verified by the numerical results of [34]. Thus, the CDF of875














where ϕˆk = E{γR∗D}E/{γˆJ∗D}.877












































Using [33, eq. (3.383.10)], we can obtain the CDF of γJRJSD as879
FγJRJS
D







































Finally, substituting x = γDth into (46), we obtain P JRJSco .880
As far as the SOP is considered, we exploit the commonly 881
used tight upper bound of γJRJSE ≥ (1/2)min{γSR, ξE} to 882
calculate it, which may be rewritten as 883
P JRJSso ≈ Pr
{
1















Substituting (9) and (25) into (47), we obtain P JRJSso . 884
APPENDIX C 885
PROOF OF LEMMA 3 886
According to the definition of the RSCP in (18), we can 887




























To make the integration mathematically tractable, we invoke 889
a simple approximation for FξE (x) by treating the AWGN term 890
“1” in ξE = γR∗E/(γJ∗E + 1) as part of the stochastic mean 891





where φˆ = λησ2RE/((1 − λ)ησ2RE + 1). 893
Then, replacing the corresponding CDFs of the second hop 894
withFξˆD (x) andFξˆE (x) in (26), the integration can be derived as 895

















Nt − 1 − n
m
)






















































where ϕˆk and φˆ are introduced by relying on the similar approx- 896
imation as in Appendix B. Then, using [33, eq. (3.383.10)], we 897
obtain P JRJSR&S . 898
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Abstract—We enhance the physical layer security (PLS) of6
amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying networks with the aid of joint7
relay and jammer selection (JRJS), despite the deleterious effect8
of channel state information (CSI) feedback delays. Furthermore,9
we conceive a new outage-based characterization approach for the10
JRJS scheme. The traditional best relay selection (TBRS) is also11
considered as a benchmark. We first derive closed-form ex-12
pressions of both the connection outage probability (COP) and13
the secrecy outage probability (SOP) for both the TBRS and14
JRJS schemes. Then, a reliable and secure connection probability15
(RSCP) is defined and analyzed for characterizing the effect of16
the correlation between the COP and the SOP introduced by the17
corporate source–relay link. The reliability–security ratio (RSR)18
is introduced for characterizing the relationship between the re-19
liability and the security through asymptotic analysis. Moreover,20
the concept of effective secrecy throughput is defined as the21
product of the secrecy rate and of the RSCP for the sake of22
characterizing the overall efficiency of the system, as determined23
by the transmit SNR, the secrecy codeword rate, and the power24
sharing ratio between the relay and the jammer. The impact of25
the direct source–eavesdropper link and additional performance26
comparisons with respect to other related selection schemes are27
also included. Our numerical results show that the JRJS scheme28
outperforms the TBRS method both in terms of the RSCP and in29
terms of its effective secrecy throughput, but it is more sensitive to30
the feedback delays. Increasing the transmit signal-to-noise ratio31
(SNR) will not always improve the overall throughput. Moreover,32
the RSR results demonstrate that, upon reducing the CSI feedback33
delays, the reliability improves more substantially than the secu-34
rity degrades, implying an overall improvement in terms of the35
security–reliability tradeoff. Additionally, the secrecy throughput36
loss due to the second-hop feedback delay is more pronounced37
than that due to the first-hop one.38
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Index Terms—Effective secrecy throughput, feedback delay, 39
physical layer security (PLS), relay and jammer selection, 40
reliability and security. 41
I. INTRODUCTION 42
43W IRELESS communications systems are particularly 4vulnerable to security attacks because of the inherent 45
openness of the transmission medium. Traditionally, the infor- 46
mation privacy of wireless networks has been focused on the 47
higher layers of the protocol stack employing cryptographically 48
secure schemes. However, these methods typically assume a 49
limited computing power for the eavesdroppers and exhibit 50
inherent vulnerabilities in terms of the inevitable secret key 51
distribution and management [1]. In recent years, physical 52
layer security (PLS) has emerged as a promising technique of 53
improving the confidentiality wireless communications, which 54
exploits the time-varying properties of fading channels, instead 55
of relying on conventional cryptosystems. The pivotal idea of 56
PLS solutions is to exploit the dynamically fluctuating random 57
nature of radio channels for maximizing the uncertainty con- 58
cerning the source messages at the eavesdropper [2], [3]. 59
To achieve this target, several PLS-enhancement approaches 60
have been proposed in the literature, including secrecy- 61
enhancing channel coding [4], secure on–off transmission de- 62
signs [5], secrecy-improving beamforming (BF)/precoding, and 63
artificial-noise-aided techniques relying on multiple antennas 64
[6], as well as secure relay-assisted transmission techniques [7]. 65
Specifically, apart from improving the reliability and coverage 66
of wireless transmissions, user cooperation also has a great 67
potential in terms of enhancing the wireless security against 68
eavesdropping attacks. There has been a growing interest in 69
improving the security of cooperative networks at the physical 70
layer [8]–[14]. To explore the spatial diversity potential of the 71
relaying networks and to boost the secrecy capacity (the differ- 72
ence between the channel capacity of the legitimate main link 73
and that of the eavesdropping link), most of the existing work 74
has been focused on secrecy-enhancing BF [8], [9], as well as 75
on intelligent relay node/jammer node (RN/JN) selection, etc. 76
Notably, given the availability of multiple relays, appropriately 77
designed RN/JN selection is capable of achieving a signifi- 78
cant security improvement for cooperative networks, which is 79
emerging as a promising research topic. In particular, Zou et al. 80
investigated both amplify-and-forward (AF)- and decode-and- 81
forward (DF)-based optimal relay selection conceived for 82
0018-9545 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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enhancing the PLS in cooperative wireless networks [10], [11],83
where the global channel state information (CSI) of both the84
main link and the eavesdropping link was assumed to be avail-85
able. Similarly, jamming techniques, which impose artificial86
interference on the eavesdropper, have also attracted substantial87
attention [12]–[14]. More specifically, several sophisticated88
joint relay and jammer selection (JRJS) schemes were proposed89
in [12], where the beneficially selected relay increases the reli-90
ability of the main link, whereas the carefully selected jammer91
imposes interference on the eavesdropper and simultaneously92
protects the legitimate destination from interference. In [13]93
and [14], cooperative jamming has been studied in the context94
of bidirectional scenarios, and efficient RN/JN selection criteria95
have been developed for achieving improved secrecy rates with96
the aid of multiple relays. Furthermore, more effective relaying97
and jamming schemes, when taking the information leakage98
of the source–eavesdropper link into consideration, have been99
presented lately in [15] and [16].100
Nevertheless, an idealized assumption of the previously re-101
ported research on PLS is the availability of perfect channel102
state information (CSI), which is regarded as a stumbling block103
in the way of invoking practical secrecy-enhancing Wyner104
coding, on–off design, BF/precoding, and RN/JN selection.105
However, this idealized simplifying assumption is not realistic,106
since practical channel estimation imposes CSI imperfections,107
which are aggravated by the feedback delay, limited-rate feed-108
back, and channel estimation errors (CEEs) [17]. Generally, the109
related research has been focused on the issues of robust secure110
BF design from an average secrecy-rate-based optimization111
perspective for point-to-point multiantenna aided channels and112
relay channels [18], [19] supporting delay-tolerant systems.113
For systems imposing stringent delay constraints, particularly114
in imperfect CSI scenarios, perfect secrecy cannot always be115
achieved. Hence, the secrecy-outage-based characterization of116
systems is more appropriate, which provides a probabilistic117
performance measure of secure communication. The concept118
of secrecy outage was adopted in [20] for characterizing the119
probability of having both reliable and secure transmission,120
which, however, is inapplicable for the imperfect CSI case and121
fails to distinguish a connection outage from the secrecy outage.122
In [21], an alternative secrecy outage formulation is proposed123
for characterizing the attainable security level and provided124
a general framework for designing transmission schemes that125
meet specific target security requirements. To quantify both the126
reliability and security performance at both the legitimate and127
eavesdropper nodes separately, two types of outages, namely,128
the connection outage probability (COP) and the secrecy outage129
probability (SOP) are introduced. Then, considering the impact130
of time delay caused by the antenna selection process at the131
legitimate receiver, Hu et al. [22] proposed a new secure132
transmission scheme in the multiinput multioutput multieaves-133
dropper wiretap channel. Much recently, considering the out-134
dated CSI from the legitimate receiver, a new secure on–off135
transmission scheme was proposed for enhancing the secrecy136
throughput in [23].137
Moreover, prior studies of the outage-based secure trans-138
mission design are limited to single-antenna-assisted single-139
hop systems and have not been considered for cooperative140
relaying systems. Hence, the issues of secure transmissions 141
over cooperative relaying channels expressed in terms of the 142
SOP, COP, and secrecy throughput constitute an open problem. 143
On the other hand, apart from CEE, the CSI feedback delay 144
results in critical challenges for the PLS of cooperative relaying 145
systems, particularly when considering the specifics of RN/JN 146
selection. In [15], the effects of outdated CSI knowledge con- 147
cerning the legitimate links on the ergodic secrecy rate achieved 148
by the proposed secure transmission strategy in the context 149
of DF relaying is investigated. The impact of CSI feedback 150
delay on the secure relay and jammer selection conceived for 151
DF relaying was investigated in [24], albeit only in terms 152
of the SOP. In our previous study [25], we considered the 153
secure transmission design and the secrecy performance of an 154
opportunistic DF system relying on outdated CSI, where only a 155
single relay is invoked. Additionally, during the revision of this 156
work, we investigated the security performance for outdated AF 157
relay selection in [26]. Therefore, in this treatise, we extend 158
our investigations to the PLS of multiple AF relaying assisted 159
networks relying on RN/JN selection. 160
Explicitly, we focus our attention on the outage-based char- 161
acterization of secure transmissions in cooperative relay-aided 162
networks relying on realistic CSI feedback delay. To exploit the 163
multirelay induced diversity gain and the associated jamming 164
capabilities, joint AF relay node and jammer node selection 165
is employed by the relay–destination link. We assume that, in 166
line with the practical reality, the instantaneous eavesdropper’s 167
CSI is unavailable at the legitimate transmitter and that the 168
RN/JN selections are performed based on the outdated CSI of 169
the main links. Two types of cooperative strategies are invoked 170
by our cooperative network operating under secrecy constraints, 171
namely, the traditional best relay selection (TBRS) strategy and 172
the JRJS strategy. Specifically, the main contributions of this 173
paper can be summarized as follows. 174
175
• We develop an outage-based characterization for quan- 176
tifying both the reliability and security performance of 177
a two-hop AF relaying system. Specifically, in contrast 178
to [21] and [22], we propose the novel definition of 179
the reliable and secure connection probability (RSCP). 180
Explicitly, closed-form expressions of the COP, the SOP, 181
and the RSCP are derived for both the TBRS and for our 182
JRJS strategies. Numerical results demonstrate that the 183
JRJS scheme outperforms the TBRS scheme in terms of 184
its RSCP. 185
• We also introduce the reliability–security ratio (RSR) 186
for characterizing their direct relationship by a single 187
parameter through the asymptotic analysis of the COP and 188
the SOP in the high-SNR regime. We derive the RSR for 189
both the TBRS and JRJS strategies for investigating the 190
effect of secrecy codeword rate setting, as well as that 191
of the feedback delay and that of the power sharing ratio 192
between the relay and the jammer on the RSR. 193
• We then modify the definition of effective secrecy 194
throughput by multiplying the secrecy rate with the RSCP, 195
which results in an optimization problem of the trans- 196
mit signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), secrecy codeword rate, 197
and power sharing between the relay and the jammer. 198
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Fig. 1. Cooperative relaying network assisted by multiple relays in the pres-
ence of an eavesdropper.
It is shown that, compared with the TBRS strategy,199
JRJS achieves a significantly higher effective secrecy200
throughput, and the corresponding throughput loss is201
more sensitive to feedback delays. The impact of the di-202
rect source–eavesdropper link and additional throughput203
performance comparisons with respect to other related204
selection schemes are further discussed.205
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.206
Section II introduces our system model and describes both207
the TBRS and our JRJS strategies. In Sections III and IV,208
we present the mathematical framework of our performance209
analysis both for the TBRS strategy and for the JRJS strategy,210
respectively, including the COP, the SOP, the RSCP, the RSR,211
and the effective secrecy throughput. Our numerical results212
and discussions are provided in Section V. Finally, Section VI213
presents our concluding remarks.214
II. SYSTEM MODEL215
A. System Description216
Consider a cooperative relaying network consisting of a217
source S, a destination D, Kr relays Rk, k = 1, . . . ,Kr, and218
an eavesdropper E, as shown in Fig. 1, where all nodes are219
equipped with a single transmit antenna (TA), except for the220
source, which has Nt TAs. The cooperative relay architecture221
in Fig. 1 is generally applicable to diverse practical wireless222
systems in the presence of an eavesdropper, including the223
family of wireless sensor networks (WSNs), mobile ad hoc224
networks (MANETs), and the long-term evolution advanced225
cellular systems [11].226
To exploit the diversity potential of multiple relay nodes over227
independently fading channels, AF relay/jammer selection is228
employed. All relays operate in the half-duplex AF mode, and229
data transmission is performed in two phases. More particu-230
larly, during the broadcast phase, the source node transmits its231
signal to a selected relay with the aid of BF, which is invoked232
for forwarding the signal received from S to D. An inherent233
assumption is that the transmit BF weights are based on the234
CSI estimates quantified and fed back by the selected relay.235
During the cooperative phase, a pair of appropriately selected236
relays transmit toward D and E, respectively. A conventional237
relay (denoted by R∗) forwards the source’s message to the 238
destination. Another relay (denoted by J∗) operates in the 239
“jammer mode” and imposes intentional interference uponE in 240
order confuse it. However, D is unable to mitigate the artificial 241
interference emanating from the jammer node J∗ due to its 242
critical secrecy constraints [12]. It should be noted that both 243
the process of RN/JN selection and the feedback of the transmit 244
BF weights from R∗ to S may impose a time lag between the 245
data transmission and the channel estimation. These time delays 246
are denoted by TdSR and TdRD , respectively. Furthermore, we 247
assume that the BF and RN/JN selection process is based 248
on the perfectly estimated but outdated CSI. We employ the 249
first-order autoregressive outdated CSI model of [20], while 250
relying on the correlation coefficients of ρSR = J0(2πfdTdSR) 251
and ρRD = J0(2πfdTdRD) for the two hops, where J0(·) is 252
the zero-order Bessel function of the first kind, and fd is the 253
Doppler frequency. 254
A slow flat block Rayleigh fading environment is assumed, 255
where the channel remains static for the coherence interval (one 256
slot) and changes independently in different coherence inter- 257
vals, as denoted by hi,j ∼ CN (0, σ2i,j), i, j ∈ {S,R, J,D,E}. 258
The direct communication links are assumed to be unavailable 259
due to the presence of obstructions between S and D, as well 260
as the eavesdropper.1 This assumption follows the rationale of 261
[12] and has been routinely exploited in previous literature (see 262
[27] and [28] and the references therein), where the source 263
and relays belong to the same cluster, whereas the destination 264
and the eavesdropper are located in another. More specifically, 265
this assumption is particularly valid in networks with broadcast 266
and unicast transmission, where each terminal is a legitimate 267
receiver for one signal and acts as an eavesdropper for some 268
other signal. Therefore, the security concerns are only related 269
to the cooperative relay-aided channel. Furthermore, additive 270
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) is assumed with zero mean 271
and unit variance N0. Let Pi be the transmit power of node 272
i, and the instantaneous SNR of the i → j link is given by 273
γi,j = Pi|hi,j |2/N0. 274
We employ the constant-rate Wyner coding scheme for con- 275
structing wiretap codes of [2] to meet the PLS requirements 276
due to the fact that the accurate global CSI is not available. 277
Let C(R0, Rs, N) denote the set of all possible Wyner codes 278
of length N , where R0 is the codeword transmission rate, and 279
Rs is the confidential information rate (R0 > Rs). The positive 280
rate difference Re = R0 −Rs is the cost of providing secrecy 281
against the eavesdropper. A confidential message is encoded 282
into a codeword at S and then transmitted to D. 283
B. Secure Transmission 284
In the broadcast phase, S transmits its BF signal s(t) to the 285
selected relay R∗, where the relay selection is performed 286
before data transmission commences, and the selection cri- 287
terion will be detailed later in the context of the cooper- 288
ative phase. The transmit BF vector w(t|Td) is calculated 289
using the perfectly estimated but outdated CSI given by 290
1The case when the S → E link is introduced will be investigated separately
in Section VI.
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w(t|TdSR) = hHSR∗(t− Td)/|hSR∗(t− TdSR)| [29], where we291
have hSR∗(t) = [hSR∗,1(t), . . . , hSR∗,Nt(t)]T , and the signal292
received by the relay R∗ can be written as293
yR∗(t) =
√
Psw(t|Td)hSR∗(t)s(t) + nSR∗(t) (1)
where nSR∗(t) is the AWGN at the relay. Then, we can294
define the received SNR at the relay node as γSR =295
PS |w(t|TdSR)hSR∗(t)|2/N0.296
In the cooperative phase, we consider two RN/JN selection297
schemes performed by D: relay selection without jamming298
and JRJS.299
1) Traditional Best Relay Selection: The first category of so-300
lutions does not involve a jamming process, and therefore, only301
a conventional relay accesses the channel during the second302
phase of the protocol. The relay selection process is performed303
based on the highest instantaneous SNR of the second hop,304
which is formulated as305












where γ˜RkD is the instantaneous SNR in the relay selection306
process, and E[γRkE ] denotes the average SNR at E. We can307
model γRkD and γ˜RkD as two gamma distributed randomAQ1 308
variables having the correlation factor of ρ2RD .309
During the second phase, the received signal yR∗(t)310
is multiplied by a time-variant AF-relay gain G and311
retransmitted to D, where we have G =312 √
PR/(PS |wopt(t|TdSR)hSR∗(t)|2 +N0). After further math-313
ematical manipulations, the mutual information (MI) between314




































2) Joint Relay and Jammer Selection: Similarly, consider-316
ing the unavailability of the instantaneous CSI regarding the317
eavesdropper, we adopt a suboptimal RN/JN selection metric318
conditioned on the outdated CSI as319












where J∗ is selected for minimizing the interference imposed320
on D.321
It should be noted that, to have the same transmit power as322
that of the TBRS case, we assume that PR∗ + PJ∗ = PR for323
our JRJS strategy and introduce λ = PR∗/(PR∗ + PJ∗) as the324
ratio of the relay’s transmit power to the total power required 325
by the active relay and jammer. 326
In the cooperative phase, R∗ will also amplify the received 327
signal yR∗(t) by G and forward it to D. At the same time, the 328
jammer J∗ will generate intentional interference to confuse E, 329
which will also cause interference at D. Consequently, the MI 330














































Remark 1: Generally, the optimal RN/JN selection scheme 332
should take into account the global SNR knowledge set 333
{γSR, γRD, γRE}. However, given the potentially excessive 334
implementational complexity overhead of the optimal selection 335
schemes and the unavailability of the global CSI, we employ 336
suboptimal selection schemes as in [12].2 Furthermore, it is 337
commonly assumed that the average SNR of the eavesdropper 338
is available at the transmitter, which seems, somehow, not 339
reasonable. However, as stated in most of the literature, such as 340
[12]–[22], [24]–[28], and [30], provided that the eavesdropper 341
belongs to the network, which is also the case in our paper, 342
the related assumption might still be deemed reasonably. Addi- 343
tionally, as in [8], [11], [12], and [24], for mathematical conve- 344
nience, we assume that the relaying channels are independent 345
and identically distributed and that we have E[γSRk ] = γ¯SR, 346
E[γRkD] = γ¯RD , and E[γRkE ] = γ¯RE . The distances between 347
the relays are assumed to be much smaller than the distances 348
between relays and source/destination/eavesdropper; hence, the 349
corresponding path losses among the different relays are ap- 350
proximately the same. This assumption is reasonable both for 351
WSNs and for MANETs associated with a symmetric clustered 352
relay configuration, and it may be also satisfied as valid by 353
classic cellular systems in a statistical sense [11]. 354
III. SECURE TRANSMISSION WITHOUT JAMMING 355
Here, we endeavor to characterize both the reliability and 356
security performance comprehensively of the TBRS scheme. 357
We first derive closed-form expressions for both the COP and 358
the SOP. Then, the RSR is introduced through the asymptotic 359
analysis of the COP and the SOP. Furthermore, we propose 360
the novel definition of the RSCP and the effective secrecy 361
throughput. 362
2To further alleviate the cooperation-related overhead, the selection criterion
is based on the R→ D link, since the second hop plays a dominant role in
determining the received SNR, because the first hop corresponds to a multiple-
input–single-output channel with the aid of multiple antennas, and hence, it is
more likely to be better than the second hop. The optimal selection based on
both hops is beyond the scope of this work.
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A. COP and SOP363
When the perfect instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper’s364
channel and even the legitimate users’ channel is unavailable,365
alternative definitions of the outage probability may be adopted366
for the statistical characterization of the attainable secrecy367
performance, particularly for delay-limited applications. Based368
on [31, Def. 2], perfect secrecy cannot be achieved, when we369
have Re < IE , where IE denotes the MI between the source370
and the eavesdropper. Encountering this event is termed as a371
secrecy outage. Furthermore, the destination is unable to flaw-372
lessly decode the received codewords when R0 > ID, which is373
termed as a connection outage. The grade of reliability and the374
grade of security maintained by a transmission scheme may be375
then quantified by the COP and the SOP, respectively.376
We continue by presenting our preliminary results versus the377
point-to-point SNRs. Let us denote the cumulative distribution378
function (CDF) and the probability density function (PDF) of a379
random variable X by FX(x) and fX(x), respectively. On one380
















γ¯NtSR(Nt − 1 − n)!
× xNt−1−ne −xγ¯SR (8)
whereas its CDF is given by382



















On the other hand, for the instantaneous SNR of the R →383
D hop, according to the principles of concomitants or induced384
order statistics, the CDF of γR∗D can be derived as in [32]385














Thus, the COP of the TBRS strategy is given by386









where we have γDth = 2











xz + x(x+ 1)
z
)]
fγSR∗(z + x)dz. (12)
Consequently, by substituting (8) and (10) into (12) and using389






















































where we have ωk = (k(1 − ρ2RD) + 1)/(k + 1). Then, by 392












where we have γEth = 2
2(R0−Rs) − 1. Similarly, we may calcu- 395
late the CDF of γTBRSE in (14) as 396
FγTBRS
E








































Then, by substitutingx = γEth into (15), we can derivePTBRSso . 397
The COP and the SOP in (11) and (14) characterize the at- 398
tainable reliability and security performance, respectively, and 399
can be regarded as the detailed requirements of accurate system 400
design. From the definition of COP and SOP, it is clear that 401
the reliability of the main link can be improved by increasing 402
the transmit SNR (or decreasing its data rate) to reduce the 403
COP, which unfortunately increases the risk of eavesdropping. 404
Thus, a tradeoff between reliability and security may be struck, 405
despite the fact that closed-from expressions cannot be obtained 406
as in [11]. Furthermore, we denote the minimal reliability and 407
security requirements by υ and δ, where the feasible range of 408
the reliability constraint is 0 < υ < 1. Bearing in mind that 409
the COP is a monotonously increasing function of R0, the 410
corresponding threshold of the codeword transmission rate is 411
Rth0 = arg{PTBRSco (R0) = υ}, which leads to a lower bound of 412
the SOP, when we have (R0 −Rs) → Rth0 . Thus, the feasible 413
range of δ is PTBRSso (Rth0 , 0) < δ < 1. The preceding analysis 414
indicates that, given a reliability constraint υ, the lower bound 415
of the security constraint is determined. 416
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B. Reliability–Security Ratio417
Here, we will focus our attention on the asymptotic analysis418
of the COP and the SOP in the high-SNR regime. Then, inspired419
by [25], we introduce the concept of the RSR for characterizing420
the direct relationship between reliability and security.421
Proposition 1: Based on the asymptotic probabilities of Pco422
and Pso at high SNRs,3 the RSR is defined as423
Pco(R0) = Λ [1 − Pso(R0, Rs)] (16)
where Λ = limη→∞ Pco/(1 − Pso), which represents the im-424
provement in COP upon decreasing the SOP. More specifically,425
since the reduction of the SOP/COP must be followed by an426
improvement of COP/SOP, a lower Λ implies that, when the427
security is reduced, the reliability is improved, and vice versa.428
Thus, for the TBRS scheme studied earlier, the RSR is derived429
as (17), shown at the bottom of the page.430
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.431
Remark 2: It can be seen from the preceding expression432
that the factor Λ is independent of the transmit SNR, but433
directly depends on the channel gains, the rate pair (R0, Rs),434
and the number of TAs and relays. For a given Rs, reducing435
R0 to enhance the reliability may erode the security, because436
(R0 −Rs) is also reduced. Conversely, increasing R0 provides437
more redundancy for protecting the security of the information,438
but simultaneously, the reliability is reduced. Hence, the RSR439
analysis underlines an important point of view concerning how440
to balance the reliability versus security tradeoff by adjusting441
(R0, Rs). Furthermore, as long as a CSI feedback delay exists,442
the RSR has an intimate relationship with ρSR and ρRD. It is443
clear that the value ofΛTBRS decreases as ρRD increases, which444
is due to the fact that the relay selection process only improves445
the reliability of the legitimate user. On the other hand, since446








(k(1 − ρ2RD) + 1)) < 1, when σ2RD and σ2RE are comparable,448
ΛTBRS will be reduced as ρSR increases. This observation449
implies that, although both Pco and (1 − Pso) are reduced450
when the first-hop CSI becomes better, the improvement of451
3Assume equal power allocation between S and the relay, yielding PS =
PR = P , and define η = P/N0 as the transmit SNR [24].
the reliability is more substantial than the security loss, as ρSR 452
increases. 453
C. Effective Secrecy Throughput 454
It should be noted that the COP and SOP metrics ignore the 455
correlation between these two outage events. More specifically, 456
in contrast to the point-to-point transmission case, since the 457
S → R link’s SNR included in the MI expressions of (3) and 458
(4), the secrecy outage and the connection outage are definitely 459
not independent of each other. Therefore, it might be of limited 460
benefit in evaluating the reliability or the security separately. 461
We note furthermore that, although another metric referred to 462
as the secrecy throughput was introduced as the product of the 463
successful decoding probability and of the secrecy rate [21], 464
[22], this definition ignores the fact that a reliable transmission 465
may be insecure, and the SOP is not taken into consideration. 466
Hence, this metric is unable to holistically characterize the 467
efficiency of our scheme, while capable of achieving both re- 468
liable and secure transmission. Therefore, here, we redefine the 469
effective secrecy throughput as the probability of a successful 470
transmission (reliable and secure) multiplied by the secrecy 471
rate, namely, as ς = RsPR&S , where the RSCP is defined as 472
PR&S = Pr{ID > R0, IE < R0 −Rs}. (18)
Upon substituting the expressions of ID and IE in (3) and (4) 473
into (18), we can rewrite PR&S for the TBRS strategy in (19), 474
shown at the bottom of the page. 475
Finally, using the corresponding CDFs and PDFs of (8)–(10) 476
from our previous analysis, we can obtain PTBRSR&S in (20), 477
shown at the bottom of the next page, as well as the secrecy 478
throughput. 479
Furthermore, considering the asymptotic result for RSCP at 480
high SNRs in (20) by applying the approximation Kv(x) ≈ 481
(v − 1)!/2(x/2)v and closing the highest terms of η after 482
invoking the McLaurin series representation for the exponential 483
function, the asymptotic effective secrecy throughput can be 484
approximated as 485
Remark 3: Given the definition of COP, SOP, and the secrecy 486
throughput result of (21), shown at the bottom of the next page, 487
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PRS may be high (i.e., close to 1), the value of ς remains small.489
By contrast, if R0 is too large, the value of Pco is close to 1,490
and therefore, ς will also become small. This observation is491
also suitable for Rs. Thus, as pointed out in the RSR analysis,492
it is elusive to improve both the reliability and the security493
simultaneously, but both of them are equally crucial in terms494
of the effective secrecy throughput, which depends on the rate495
pair (R0, Rs).496
Additionally, (21) also reveals that increasing the SNR would497
drastically reduce the effective secrecy throughput. For high498
transmit SNRs, a high reliability can indeed be perfectly guar-499
anteed, but at the same time, the grade of the security is severely500
degraded. However, the probability of a reliable and simultane-501
ously secure transmission will tend toward zero. Hence, we may502
conclude that there exists an optimal SNR, which achieves the503
maximal secrecy throughput.504
In conclusion, adopting the appropriate code rate pair and505
transmit SNR is crucial for achieving the maximum effective506
secrecy throughput, which can be formulated as507
max
R0,Rs,η
ς(R0, Rs) = RsP
TBRS
R&S
s.t. Pco ≤ υ, Pso ≤ δ, 0 < Rs < R0 (22)
where υ and δ denote the system’s reliability and security508
requirements. Unfortunately, it is quite a challenge to find509
the closed-form optimal solution to this problem due to the510
complexity of the expressions. Although suboptimal solutions511
can be found numerically (with the aid of gradient-based search512
techniques), the secrecy throughput optimization problem and513
the corresponding complexity analysis and performance com-514
parisons are beyond the scope of this work.515
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION WITH JAMMING516
Here, we consider the extension of the aforementioned relay517
selection approaches to systems additionally invoking relay-518
aided jamming. JRJS is based on the outdated but perfectly 519
estimated CSI, and the details have been presented in Section II. 520
We would also like to investigate the security performance 521
from an outage-based perspective. The COP, SOP, RSCP, and 522
effective secrecy throughput will be included. 523
A. COP and SOP 524
It is plausible that the main differences between the JRJS and 525
TBRS schemes are determined by the instantaneous SNR of the 526
R → D hop, where, now, a jammer is included. Based on our 527
preliminary results detailed for the point-to-point SNRs in (8) 528
and (10), we now focus our attention on the statistical analysis 529
of the SNR, including J∗. As stated for the JRJS scheme in 530
Section II, J∗ corresponds to the lowest γ˜RkD and is selected 531
from the set {R−R∗}. Recalling that R∗ is the best relay 532
of the second hop, we have γ˜J∗D = minRk∈R−R∗{γ˜RkD} Δ= 533
minRk∈R{γ˜RkD} for Kr > 1. Using the induced order statis- 534
tics, the corresponding CDF of γR∗D is presented in (10), 535







[(Kr − 1) (1 − ρ2RD) + 1] γ¯JD
. (23)
Although the relay and jammer selection processes are not 537
entirely disjoint, we may exploit the assumption that γR∗D and 538
γJ∗D are independent of each other, which is valid when the 539
number of relays is sufficiently high, as justified in [24]. Let us 540
define the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the second 541
hop as ξD = γR∗D/(γJ∗D + 1), using (10) and (23), whose 542
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As far as the eavesdropper is concerned, γR∗E and γJ∗E545
are independent and exponentially distributed. Furthermore, for546
ξE = γR∗E/(γJ∗E + 1), we have547






where φ = λ/(1 − λ). According to the definition of COP and548
SOP in Section III-A, we can obtain the following closed-form549
approximations of the COP and the SOP.4550
Lemma 1: The COP and the SOP of the JRJS strategy551
associated with feedback delays are approximated by552























































where ϕˆk = Krλωkησ2RD/([(Kr − 1)(1 − ρ2RD) + 1](1 −553
λ)ησ2RD +Kr), and554






























Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.555
The feasible range of the reliability constraint is similar to556
that of the TBRS strategy, and hence, it is omitted here.557
B. Reliability–Security Ratio558
Lemma 2: Recalling the definition in Section III, the RSR559
for the JRJS strategy may be expressed in (28), shown at the560
bottom of the page.561
4When we have λ→ 1, (24) will degenerate into the TBRS case seen in
(10). The performance analysis of the JRJS will be presented separately in the
following, since several approximations have to be included.
It can be seen from the previous expression that, in contrast 562
to the analysis of the TBRS strategy operating without jam- 563
ming, for a fixed SNR threshold, the CDF of the second-hop 564
SNR will converge to a nonzero limit. We also find that this 565
limit is determined by the power sharing ratio between the 566
relay and the jammer. Furthermore, according to the analy- 567
sis of the TBRS strategy, for η → ∞, we have FγSR∗ (x) → 568
0. Thus, by exploiting the tight upper bound that γTBRSD ≤ 569
min{γSR, γR∗D} and γTBRSE ≤ min{γSR, γR∗E}, we have 570
P JRJS,∞co →FγξD (γDth) and 1−P JRJS,∞so →FγξE (γEth). Finally, 571
substituting the corresponding results into (16), we arrive at the 572
RSR of the JRJS strategy. 573
Remark 4: It can be seen from the RSR expression of (28) 574
again that the rate-pair setting (R0, Rs) has an inconsistent 575
influence on the RSR, and hence, we have to carefully adjust R0 576
and Rs to balance the reliability versus security performance. 577
Let us now focus our attention on the differences between the 578
JRJS scheme and the TBRS arrangement. 579
First, we may find that the power sharing ratio λ between 580
the relay and the jammer plays a very important role. The 581
optimization of λ will be investigated from an effective secrecy 582
throughput optimization point of view in the following. 583
Second, it is plausible that, in contrast to the behavior of the 584
TBRS strategy, ΛJRJS of (28) is only related to the delay of the 585
second hop, but it is still a monotonically decreasing function of 586
ρRD. This implies that the improvement of the channel quality 587
of the JRJS will achieve a more pronounced COP improvement 588
than the associated SOP improvement. Furthermore, recalling 589
that the RSR is considered in the high-SNR region, it has no 590
dependence on the first hop quality. This is due to the fact that 591
if the first-hop channel quality is sufficiently high for ensuring 592
a successful transmission, the asymptotic CDFs of ξD and ξE 593
in (29) and (30) associated with η → ∞ will converge to a AQ2594
nonzero limit at high SNRs, which ultimately dominates the 595
COP and the SOP. 596
C. Effective Secrecy Throughput 597
Before proceeding to the effective secrecy throughput analy- 598
sis, we also have to investigate the RSCP. 599
Lemma 3: The RSCP of our JRJS strategy may be approxi- 600
mated as in (31), shown at the bottom of the next page, where 601
we have θ1,k = (γDth(γDth + 1))/(γDth + ϕˆk), θ2 = γDth − γEth + 602
(γEth(γ
E
th+1)/(γEth+ φˆ)), and φˆ=λησ2RE/((1−λ)ησ2RE + 1). 603
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C. 604
Apart from the rate pair (R0, Rs), the aforementionedP JRJSR&S 605
of (31) is also a function of the power sharing ratio λ between 606
the selected relay and the jammer. 607
Given the complexity of the RSCP expression, it is quite 608









) (−1)kKr [(Kr − 1) (1 − ρ2RD)+ 1] [(λ−1 − 1)(22(R0−Rs) − 1)+ 1]
[(Kr − 1) (1 − ρ2RD) + 1] (k + 1)(λ−1 − 1)(22R0 − 1) +Kr [k (1 − ρ2RD) + 1]
(28)
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effective secrecy throughput that max0<λ<1 ς = RsP JRJSR&S . Al-610
ternatively, we can focus on the asymptotic analysis in the high-611
SNR region and try to find a general closed-form solution for λ.612
Specifically, when we have η → ∞, P JRJSR&S will be dominated613
by the channel quality of the second hop; hence, we have614


















where the approximation is based on the fact that, in contrast to615
both FξD (γDth) andFξE (γEth), which converge to a nonzero limit616
regardless of η, the first hop’s FγSR(x) will tend to zero, and617
hence, it can be neglected. Substituting the asymptotic results618
of (29) and (30) into (33), we can obtainP JRJS,∞R&S . In contrast to619
the TBRS case operating without jamming, as the SNR tends to620
∞, the RSCP will tend to a nonzero value and, upon increasing621
the transmit SNR beyond a certain limit, will no longer increase622
the effective secrecy throughput.623
Then, based on (32), we arrive at the approximated optimal624
value λopt, which is the solution of the following equation:625
∂P JRJS,∞R&S (R0, Rs, λ)
∂λ
= 0. (33)
Then, by exploiting the approximation of [k(1 − ρ2RD) + 1]/626
(k + 1) ≈ 1 − ρ2RD in (29) for a large ρRD (practically, the CSI627







where γth = (22R0 − 1)(22(R0−Rs) − 1). It is clear that this629
value is determined by the number of relays and (R0, Rs).630
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS631
Both our numerical and Monte Carlo simulation results are632
presented here for verifying the theoretical PLS performance633
analysis of the multiple-relay-aided network under CSI feed-634
Fig. 2. COP and SOP versus transmit SNR for the TBRS and JRJS strategies
in conjunction with different rate pairs, for Nt = Kr = 3, fdTd = 0.1, and
λ = 1/10.
back delays. Explicitly, the COP, SOP, RSCP, and RSR are 635
validated for both the TBRS and JRJS strategies. Furthermore, 636
the effects of feedback delays and system parameters (including 637
the transmission rate pair (R0, Rs) and the power sharing ratio 638
λ between the relay and the jammer) on the achievable effective 639
secrecy throughput are evaluated. The Rayleigh fading model 640
is employed for characterizing all communication links in our 641





RE = 1, and used TdSR = TdRD = Td. 643
Fig. 2 plots the COP and the SOP versus the transmit SNR for 644
both the TBRS and JRJS strategies in conjunction with different 645
rate pairs. The analytical lines are plotted by using (11) and (14) 646
for the TBRS strategy and by using (26) and (27) for the JRJS 647
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Fig. 3. SOP versus COP for the TBRS and JRJS strategies with different
feedback delays for Nt = Kr = 3, Rs = R0/8, and λ = 1/10.
case, respectively. It can be clearly seen from the figure that the648
analytical and simulated outage probability curves match well,649
which confirms the accuracy of the mathematical analysis. As650
expected, compared with the TBRS strategy, the SOP of the651
JRJS strategy is much better, whereas the COP is worse. We652
can also find that both the COP and the SOP will converge to an653
outage floor at high SNRs for the JRJS strategy. The reason for654
this is that the jammer also imposes interference on the destina-655
tion and the interference inflicted increases with the SNR. Thus,656
the designers have to take into account the tradeoff between657
the reliability and the security and the interference imposed on658
D, particularly when considering the JRJS strategy. Moreover,659
we can observe in Fig. 2 that increasing the transmission rate660
decreases the COP and increases the SOP.661
Fig. 3 further characterizes the SOP versus COP for both the662
TBRS and JRJS strategies based on the numerical results in663
Fig. 2, which shows the tradeoff between the reliability and the664
security. It can be seen from the figure that the SOP decreases as665
the COP increases, and for a specific COP, the SOP of the JRJS666
scheme is strictly lower than that of TBRS. This confirms that667
the JRJS scheme performs better than the conventional TBRS668
scheme. Furthermore, the CSI feedback delay will also degrade669
the system tradeoff performance.670
Fig. 4 illustrates the RSCP versus transmit SNR for the671
TBRS strategy in the context of different network configura-672
tions, including different rate pairs, different number of relays,673
and both perfect and outdated CSI feedback scenarios. The674
analytical lines are plotted by using the approximation in (20).675
We may conclude from the figure that the rate-pair setting676
(R0, Rs) determines both the reliability and security transmis-677
sion performance. These curves also show that the RSCP is a678
concave function of the transmit SNR, whereas the continued679
boosting of the SNR would only decrease the probability of680
a successful transmission. We can observe from Fig. 4 that,681
Fig. 4. RSCP versus transmit SNR for the TBRS strategy with different rate
pairs for Nt = Kr = 3, fdTd = 0.1.
Fig. 5. RSCP versus transmit SNR for the JRJS strategy for different
power sharing ratios λ and for Nt = Kr = 3, fdTd = 0.1, and R0 = 1,
Rs = R0/8.
for a high transmit SNR, total reliability can be guaranteed, 682
whereas the associated grade of security is severely eroded. 683
Furthermore, increasing the number of relays and decreasing 684
the feedback delay will improve both the reliability and security 685
performance. 686
The RSCP of the JRJS strategy is presented in Fig. 5 for 687
different power sharing ratios between relaying and jamming. 688
Both the integration form (45) and the approximated closed 689
form in (31) match well with the Monte Carlo simulations. 690
The performance of the TBRS strategy is also included for 691
comparison. The JRJS scheme outperforms the TBRS operating 692
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Fig. 6. RSR versus feedback delay coefficient (R0 = 1, Rs = R0/8, λ =
3/4) and power sharing ratio λ (Rs = R0/8, ρSR = ρRD = 0.9) for the
TBRS and JRJS strategies, with Nt = Kr = 3.
without jamming under the scenario considered when encoun-693
tering comparable relay–destination and relay–eavesdropper694
channels. For some extreme configurations (when the relay–695
eavesdropper links are comparatively weak), this statement696
may not hold, but this scenario is beyond the scope of this697
paper. The maximum RSCP appears at about η = 15 dB698
for the JRJS strategy using λ = 3/4, whereas it is η = 10 dB699
for the TBRS strategy. Furthermore, as expected, increasing the700
number of available relays and jamming nodes will always be701
able to improve the reliability and security performance. How-702
ever, the continued boosting of the jammer’s power (decreasing703
λ) will not always improve the overall performance, because704
the interference improves initially the security, but then, it starts705
to reduce the reliability as λ decreases. This further motivates706
the designer to carefully take into account the power sharing707
between relaying and jamming. The effect of the rate-pair708
setting on the security and reliability of the JRJS strategy is709
neglected here, which follows a similar trend to that of the710
TBRS strategy.711
Fig. 6 characterizes the RSR versus feedback delay and712
power sharing ratio for both TBRS and JRJS, in which the713
RSR curves are plotted by using (17) and (28), respectively.714
The first illustration shows that the RSR decreases as the delay715
coefficients (ρSR and ρRD), which confirms that the im-716
provement of reliability becomes more pronounced than the717
reduction of the security as the feedback delay decreases.718
This observation implies an improvement in terms of the719
security–reliability tradeoff. In addition, the RSR versus ρRD720
is larger than that of ρSR, which indicates that the impact of the721
second-hop CSI feedback delay is more prominent. The other722
illustration in the right demonstrates that the RSR is a concave723
function of the power sharing ratio, which reflects the tradeoff724
between the reliability and the security struck by adjusting λ.725
Fig. 7. Percentage secrecy throughput loss versus delay coefficients with
Nt = Kr = 3, R0 = 1, Rs = R0/8, λ = 3/4, and η = 10 dB.
Fig. 8. Secrecy throughput versus R0 and κ = Rs/R0 for both the TBRS
and JRJS strategies with Nt = Kr = 3, fdTd = 0.1, and η = 15 dB.
To further evaluate the effect of feedback delays on the 726
secrecy performance, Fig. 7 plots the resultant percentage of 727





It can be seen from the figure that, compared with the TBRS 729
scheme, JRJS is more sensitive to the feedback delays. Further- 730
more, recalling that increasing the delay coefficient ρSR of the 731
first hop improves the reliability, but at the same time also helps 732
the eavesdropper, it is not surprising that the secrecy throughput 733
loss due to the second-hop feedback delay is more pronounced. 734
Fig. 8 illustrates the achievable effective secrecy throughput 735
for both the TBRS and JRJS strategies versus the codeword 736
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Fig. 9. Secrecy throughput versus R0 and λ for the JRJS strategy with Nt =
Kr = 3, fdTd = 0.1, η = 15 dB, and Rs/R0 = 1/8.
transmission rate R0 and the secrecy code ratio κ = Rs/R0737
with no outage constraints (υ = δ = 1). The values of the738
effective secrecy throughput are plotted by using ς = RsPR&S .739
We can observe in Fig. 8 that, subject to a fixed code rate740
ratio κ, the effective secrecy throughput increases to a peak741
value as R0 reaches its optimal value and then decreases. This742
phenomenon can be explained as follows. At a low transmission743
rate, although the COP increases with R0, which has a negative744
effect on the effective secrecy throughput, both the secrecy745
rate and the SOP performance will benefit. However, after746
reaching the optimal R0, the effective secrecy throughput drops747
since the main link cannot afford a reliable transmission, and748
the resultant COP increase becomes dominant. On the other749
hand, subject to a fixed R0 (which results in a constant COP),750
the effective secrecy throughput is also a concave function751
of κ, and increasing the code rate ratio ultimately results752
in an increased secrecy information rate at the cost of an753
increased SOP.754
The achievable effective secrecy throughput for the JRJS755
strategy is also presented in Fig. 8, and similar conclusions and756
trends can be observed to that of the TBRS case. Additionally,757
the comparison of the two strategies indicates that the JRJS758
scheme attains a higher effective secrecy throughput than the759
TBRS scheme operating without jamming, even if no power760
sharing optimization has been employed.761
Fig. 9 further illustrates the impact of power sharing between762
the relay and the jammer on the achievable effective secrecy763
throughput of the JRJS strategy versus R0 in the absence of764
outage constraints. Given a fixed code rate pair (R0, Rs), the765
effective secrecy throughput follows the trend of the RSCP,766
which is a concave function of λ, as shown in Fig. 6. The767
interference introduced by the jammer initially improves both768
the reliability and the security as λ increases, but this trend is769
reversed beyond a certain point.770
Fig. 10. Comparisons for different strategies with and without the S–E link,
for Nt = Kr = 3, R0 = 1, Rs = R0/8, fdTd = 0.1, and λ = 3/4.
VI. DISCUSSION 771
A. Impact of the S–E Link 772
We note that the introduction of the S–E link, i.e., the 773
information leakage in the first phase, is very critical to the 774
security. There are also some research studies focusing on 775
the corresponding secure transmission design and performance 776
evaluation for cooperative networks with the S–E link, such 777
as [15] and [16]. Here, we assume that the eavesdropper can 778
receive information directly from the source in the first phase. 779
Thus, following the steps in the prior sections, for the TBRS 780
and JRJS schemes, it is clear that the SNR experienced at the 781
eavesdropper should be rewritten as 782
γ˜τE = γSE + γ
τ
E (36)
where γSE = Ps|wopt(t|TdSR)hSE(t)|2/N0 follows the ex- 783
ponential distribution with the average value γ¯SE , τ = 784
{TBRS, JRJS}, and γτE has been defined in (4) and (7). 785
Then, the corresponding SOP, RSCP, and effective secrecy 786
throughput have to be reconsidered. Unfortunately, to the best 787
of our knowledge, it is a mathematically intractable problem 788
to obtain closed-form results for the related performance eval- 789
uations. Therefore, we resorted to numerical simulations for 790
further investigating the impact of the S–E link. Fig. 10 com- 791
pares the effective secrecy throughput of the TBRS and JRJS 792
schemes both with and without considering the direct S–E 793
link. It becomes clear that the information leakage in the first 794
phase will lead to a severe security performance degradation, 795
particularly for the JRJS scheme, which will no longer be 796
capable of maintaining a steady throughput at high SNRs. The 797
reason for this trend is that increasing the transmit SNR will 798
help the eavesdropper in the presence of the direct S–E link. 799
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B. Comparisons800
Here, based on the outdated CSI assumption, we provide per-801
formance comparisons with a range of other schemes advocated802
in [12] with the aid of the proposed outage-based characteriza-803
tion. Fig. 10 also incorporates our effective secrecy throughput804
performance comparison, where the optimal selection (OS)805
regime and the optimal selection combined with jamming (OSJ)806
were proposed in [12]. They are formulated as807




















where γ˜RkE is the delayed version of the instantaneous CSI of808
the R–E link. It should be noted that this constitutes an entirely809
new performance characterization of these schemes from the810
perspective of the effective secrecy throughput. It is shown in811
Fig. 1 that the selection combined with jamming outperforms812
the corresponding nonjamming techniques at high SNRs, albeit813
this trend may no longer prevail at low SNRs. In comparison,814
compared with those selections relying on the average SNRs of815
the R–E link, the optimal selections relying on the idealized816
simplifying assumptions of having global CSI (OS and OSJ817
schemes) knowledge can only achieve throughput gains at high818
SNRs due to the inevitable feedback delay.819
VII. CONCLUSION820
An outage-based characterization of cooperative relay net-821
works has been provided in the face of CSI feedback delays.822
Two types of relaying strategies were considered, namely, the823
TBRS strategy and the JRJS strategy. Closed-form expressions824
of the COP, the SOP, and the RSCP, as well as of the RSR,825
were derived. The RSR results demonstrated that the reliability826
is improved more substantially than the security performance827
when the CSI feedback delays are reduced. Furthermore, we828
presented a modified effective secrecy throughput definition829
and demonstrated that the JRJS strategy achieves a significant830
effective secrecy throughput gain over the TBRS strategy. The831
transmit SNR, the secrecy codeword rate setting, and the power832
sharing ratio between the relay and jammer nodes play impor-833
tant roles in striking a balance between the reliability and the834
security in terms of the secrecy throughput. The impact of the835
direct S–E link and the performance comparisons with other836
selection schemes were also included. Additionally, our results837
demonstrate that JRJS is more sensitive to the feedback delays838
and that the secrecy throughput loss due to the second-hop839
feedback delay is more pronounced than that due to the first-840
hop one.841
APPENDIX A842
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1843
To simplify the asymptotic performance analysis, (3) can be844
expressed in a more mathematically tractable form by the com-845
monly used tight upper bound of γTBRSD ≤ min{γSR, γR∗D}846
and γTBRSE ≤ min{γSR, γR∗E}. When we have η → ∞, based 847
on the CDFs in (9) and (10) and closing the smallest order terms 848


































































where O(x) denotes the high-order infinitely small contribu- 850
tions as a function of x, and 851











1 − k + 1


























Then, applying the upper bound of the receiver SNR, we may 852
rewrite the COP and the SOP of the TBRS strategy at high 853
SNRs as 854






























and according to the fact that γR∗E is exponentially distributed, 855
we have 856























Finally, substituting (41) and (42) into the definition of RSR 857
in (16), we can obtain (17). 858
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APPENDIX B859
PROOF OF LEMMA 1860
According to the description of COP and SOP, replacing861
FγR∗D(x) andFγR∗E (x) byFξD (x) andFξE (x) in (12) and (14)862
will involve a mathematically intractable integration of the form863











which, to the best of our knowledge, does not have a closed-864
form solution. Alternatively, bearing in mind that the preceding865
integration has a great matter with ξD, we now focus our866
attention on the approximation of ξD . Based on the PDF867
results in (23), it may be seen that γJ∗D obeys an exponential868
distribution. Then, we can approximate γˆJ∗D = γJ∗D + 1 by869
the exponential distribution as well, with an average value870
of E{γˆJ∗D} = ([(Kr − 1)(1 − ρ2RD) + 1]γ¯RD +Kr)/Kr by871
assuming that the AWGN term “1” is part of the stochastic872
mean terms. The approximation based on this method provides873
a very accurate analysis, and the accuracy of this method is874
verified by the numerical results of [34]. Thus, the CDF of875














where ϕˆk = E{γR∗D}E/{γˆJ∗D}.877












































Using [33, eq. (3.383.10)], we can obtain the CDF of γJRJSD as879
FγJRJS
D







































Finally, substituting x = γDth into (46), we obtain P JRJSco .880
As far as the SOP is considered, we exploit the commonly 881
used tight upper bound of γJRJSE ≥ (1/2)min{γSR, ξE} to 882
calculate it, which may be rewritten as 883

















Substituting (9) and (25) into (47), we obtain P JRJSso . 884
APPENDIX C 885
PROOF OF LEMMA 3 886
According to the definition of the RSCP in (18), we can 887




























To make the integration mathematically tractable, we invoke 889
a simple approximation for FξE (x) by treating the AWGN term 890
“1” in ξE = γR∗E/(γJ∗E + 1) as part of the stochastic mean 891





where φˆ = λησ2RE/((1 − λ)ησ2RE + 1). 893
Then, replacing the corresponding CDFs of the second hop 894
withFξˆD (x) andFξˆE (x) in (26), the integration can be derived as 895

















Nt − 1 − n
m
)






















































where ϕˆk and φˆ are introduced by relying on the similar approx- 896
imation as in Appendix B. Then, using [33, eq. (3.383.10)], we 897
obtain P JRJSR&S . 898
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